Picture this: it’s 2021. You’re an IT professional, scrolling through LinkedIn, when a message pings. “Bastion Secure,” a new cybersecurity company, is hiring. The pay? Excellent. Remote work? Absolutely. A chance to tinker with cutting-edge tech? You bet. For dozens, this looked like the career lottery win. What they didn’t clock was that their new “employer” was the infamous cybercriminal syndicate, FIN7.
This isn’t just another tale of a clever job scam. This is a masterclass in how criminals exploit the human trust in our increasingly digital world. It’s a story of deception so bold, it forces us to confront some unsettling truths about the state of our security.
Building Believability: The Art of the Digital Masquerade
FIN7 didn’t just cobble together a few fake job ads. They birthed an entire corporate persona. “Bastion Secure” had the full digital kit and caboodle: a slick website, active LinkedIn profiles for its “staff,” and a social media feed buzzing with industry chatter. They were sharing articles, weighing in on cybersecurity trends – essentially, LARPing as a legitimate cybersecurity firm.
Pause for a moment and let that sink in: hardened cybercriminals meticulously crafting fake cybersecurity content to dupe actual cybersecurity professionals into, albeit unknowingly, committing cybercrime. It’s like a Russian doll of deception, only each doll is sporting a company-branded hoodie and has “blockchain enthusiast” in its bio.
The charade extended to the hiring process. Video interviews with seemingly real people, professional onboarding packs, employee handbooks, NDAs – the works. Everything was like legitimate job interviews. They even had that awkward ‘So, where do you see yourself in five years?’ question.” According to researchers at firms like Recorded Future’s Gemini Advisory, who tracked FIN7’s front companies extensively, these operations were disturbingly sophisticated.
The Wolf in CISO’s Clothing
What made the Bastion Secure ruse so devilishly clever was its exploitation of the cybersecurity industry’s own credibility markers. The company purported to offer genuine penetration testing services – a vital and respected security function. They bandied about industry-standard jargon, referenced common tools, and outlined familiar procedures.
Their job descriptions? You’d swear they were lifted from industry stalwarts like Mandiant or CrowdStrike (and let’s be honest, they probably were). They discussed genuine security challenges and, crucially, demonstrated what appeared to be authentic technical know-how. It’s as if they knew the industry better than some actual security companies.
The Sting: Weaponising Expertise
This operation wasn’t just about hiring people; it was about weaponising their legitimate skills. The setup was alarmingly convincing:
- A hiring process that mirrored legitimate tech recruitment.
- Professional, technically sound job interviews.
- Real technical assessments that tested genuine skills.
- Comprehensive employee onboarding and training materials.
Under the guise of “client projects” and “penetration tests,” these new hires were, in reality:
- Mapping the networks of actual targeted corporations.
- Identifying existing security systems and potential vulnerabilities.
- In some instances, creating backdoors and deploying malware under the belief they were testing defences.
The victims believed they were conducting legitimate security assessments. Instead, they unknowingly became the front line for one of the world’s most successful cybercrime groups, helping them breach real companies. The genius of FIN7’s scheme wasn’t just in building a fake company; it was their profound understanding of the cybersecurity industry’s operational norms:
- Remote work is prevalent and accepted.
- Penetration testing, by its nature, often involves activities that closely resemble actual attack techniques.
- Security professionals are constantly adapting to new tools and systems.
- The gig economy, with contract and project-based work, is common.
Court documents and detailed research reveal FIN7 also operated another front company, “Combi Security,” to further legitimise their recruitment efforts. They advertised on mainstream job boards and conducted rigorous technical interviews.
Just think about the audacity of it: hiring security professionals to undo security. It’s like employing a team of Gordon Ramsay-level chefs and tricking them into catering a state banquet with nothing but instant noodles. They have the skills, the tools, the professionalism – but the end product is a disaster.
The documented impact of FIN7’s campaigns is eye-watering. According to U.S. Department of Justice records and various cybersecurity threat reports:
- Compromise of over 6,500 point-of-sale systems.
- Estimated fraud losses exceeding $1 billion.
- The theft of more than 100 million customer payment card records.
- Attacks spanning 47 U.S. states and numerous countries. [(Source: U.S. Department of Justice, various indictments and press releases concerning FIN7)].
Trust is a Target
The implications for the cybersecurity sector are profound and uncomfortable. When criminals can construct an entire counterfeit cybersecurity company that passes the scrutiny of seasoned professionals, we are forced to re-evaluate how we establish and verify trust.
Consider these sobering findings from the investigations:
- Professional Vetting Got Played: Candidates conducted due diligence. They checked company registrations, scoured for reviews, and even tried to verify professional references. Everything appeared to be above board.
- Technical Validation Was Subverted: The tools provided were industry-standard. The work methodologies aligned with accepted practices. Documentation was polished. Technical assignments were indistinguishable from legitimate tasks.
Lessons from the Masquerade: Seeing Through the Facade
What elevates the FIN7 saga to a masterclass in modern social engineering is that they didn’t just forge credentials; they fabricated an entire, plausible security ecosystem. It’s like meticulously building a perfect replica of Fort Knox, not to steal its gold, but to convince others to help you rob every other bank.
Key takeaways from this audacious operation:
- A Professional Veneer Isn’t Proof of Professionalism: A glossy website, fluent use of industry jargon, and adherence to standard procedures are no longer reliable indicators of legitimacy. They are, in cases like this, merely sophisticated stage props.
- Expertise Itself Can Be the Weapon: The very tools, methodologies, and documentation that define legitimate security work were turned against the industry.
- The Human Element is Still Decisive (and Vulnerable): Even highly skilled security professionals can be deceived when the lure is potent – legitimate-seeming job offers, authentic-feeling work, real paycheques, and familiar tools.
“They weren’t just mimicking a security company, they were operating one – just with a different, criminal objective.”
Hardening Ourselves: Beyond the Usual Defences
The FIN7 “Bastion Secure” episode teaches an important lesson: sometimes the most significant threats don’t come dressed as rotten apples; they come dressed as us. So, how do we defend against such perfect pretenders?
The investigations and subsequent analyses point towards a multi-layered approach:
Radical Due Diligence on Employers/Partners:
- Don’t just confirm a company exists; delve into its operational history, verifiable leadership, and physical presence (if claimed).
- Cross-reference with established industry bodies and trusted networks. Be wary of entities with no discernible track record or unverifiable claims.
Scrutinise, Then Trust (Maybe):
- Even if tools and methodologies appear standard, question their application in context. Who are the end “clients”? Can they be independently verified?
- Insist on transparency and maintain meticulous records of all engagements, especially in remote or contract scenarios.
Cultivate Robust Trust Networks:
- Strengthen relationships with verified security companies and professionals.
- Establish and participate in trusted channels for sharing intelligence on suspicious activities or entities. Open communication is key.
Closing Thoughts: The Uncomfortable Truth
“The most dangerous attackers aren’t the ones trying to break security – they’re the ones becoming security.”
Or, as I often tell people: “If something looks too legitimate to be legitimate, it probably is.”
Because ultimately, FIN7 didn’t just exploit technical vulnerabilities. They exploited something far more ingrained: our industry’s inherent culture of trust and the assumptions that come with it. And that is a vulnerability for which the patch is still very much in development.